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[The pilots] raised the keys and set the mechanism in motion. All 
that could be seen were copper wheels, some upright, some 
horizontal, turning furiously. Some were the size of millstones, 
others of pulley wheels. [The carriages] seemed like pinwheels, and 
each one rose up spinning. In an instant they were a few feet off the 
ground. Then they rose straight up to a height of more than a 
hundred feet and headed due West.1
The above passage is not out of an H. G. Wells or Jules Verne story, but from the 
Chinese novel, Ching-hua yuan (Flowers in a Mirror), published circa 1830.2 
Although this novel has been appreciated for a number of its themes, not least its 
feminist sympathies 3 the great delight in technology for which many of its 
characters feel has not, until recently, received attention. One character steers 
across the ocean with a magnetic compass; warriors carry "linked-pearls" muskets 
(a kind of primitive machine gun); the King of the 'Country of Women' consults a 
striking clock to check if there is time for the nuptial banquet. Not only do the 
protagonists of the novel enjoy their technological superiority, but also they like to 
give technical assistance to less advanced peoples: "in the Country of Women, 
T'ang the Roamer teaches the female inhabitants how to make cast-iron tools and 
delivers a lecture on hydraulics."4 Whatever the literary interpretation of these
* Th
e author wishes to thank Mark Elvin, who generously shared his unpublished work with 
   her. 
1 Quoted in Elvin (1991) 56. 
2 See Elvin (1991), Evans (1970), Hsia (1974) and Yu (1974) for further information about this 
   novel. 
3 For this phenomenon, see Brandauer (1977). 
4 Cited, and translated by Elvin (1991) 55.
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passages, they do indicate quite clearly an appreciation of technological ingenuity. 
Seagoing ships, chronometers, and firearms were not, in the words of the well-
known historian of Chinese technology, Mark Elvin, European monopolies. 
     While some readers may see Ching-hua yuan as simply literary recreation, it 
is, nevertheless, a certain indication of how Chinese intellectuals could fantasize 
about technology in the early nineteenth century. If this is indeed the case, then 
the novel presents a contrasting image of Chinese attitudes toward this subject 
circa 1830, expressed by many contemporary Western observers. As Michael 
Adas has documented so well, Westerners at this time were exasperated by the 
idea that the Chinese refused to recognize the superiority of Western technology 
over indigenous tools and machines. In 1835, for example, the Reverend Jacob 
Abbott wrote that 'self-conceit' prevented the Chinese from appreciating the 
advantages of the weapons and machines, which Lord Macartney had brought to 
China, over their own.5 In preparation for his study, China and the English (1835), 
Abbott had utilized John Barrow's Travels in China, a work full of disparagement 
toward Chinese attitudes concerning science and technology. Writing in 1804 
about his experiences in China during the Macartney Embassy in 1793, Barrow 
noted: "The practical application of some of the most obvious effects produced by 
natural causes could not escape observation of a people who had, at an early 
period, attained such a high degree of civilization, but satisfied with the practical 
part; they pushed their enquiries no farther."6 
     While Westerners in the first half of the nineteenth century drew ever more 
to the conclusion that China was "scientifically and technologically backward", 
they did not lose confidence in the idea that the Chinese were capable of adopting, 
if they chose to do so, the technical achievements of the West. Westerners 
continued to be impressed with earlier Chinese technological accomplishments: 
its bridges and canals, sailing vessels and water mills were all reminders of what a 
great civilization China had once been and could be, if only the country could 
overcome its "stagnation" .7 In a brief essay, published in 1838, "The Intellectual 
Character of the Chinese", three missionaries noted that "without exception, the 
'natural (mental) endowment' of the Chinese was equal to that of any other people 
on earth." 8 In short, it was not 'intellectual deficiency' that kept Chinese from
5 Adas (1989) 231. For a complete list of those apparati (both scientific instruments and 
   technological devices) that Macartney brought to China, see Cranmer-Byng and Levere (1981) 
  520-523. 
6 See Adas (1989) 190. The recent work by the French writer Alain Peyrefitte (1989), which is 
   nothing more than a catalogue of China's faults for allowing itself to 'fall behind', is a good 
   example of how this attitude still pervades Western thinking. See my critique of this work in 
  Zurndorfer (1989). 
7 Adas (1989) 285. 
8 Cited in Adas (1989) 285.
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borrowing Western technology, but xenophobia; Chinese ethnocentrism was the 
root of this "blindness". 
     Despite the overwhelming documentation on China's supposed reluctance 
to utilize Western technology in the nineteenth century, there has been, 
surprisingly, little published research on the problem of technology transfer from 
the West to China. And what little that has been produced has generally 
concentrated on China's special political culture as the source of its technological 
poverty. The two most common reasons stated for China's inability "to take off", 
after having been exposed to Western military weaponry during and after the 
Opium War, focus upon the "despotism" of the Court, and the country's 
reverence for past precedents, presumably by the scholar-official ruling class.9 
Had China acted more perspicuously, so these critics write, the country would 
have realized the real meaning of the Western intrusion, and taken realistic 
measures to counter the enemy. 
     Interestingly, Mark Elvin, whose publications have pioneered new and 
different ways of examining the history of the Chinese economy, has introduced 
the concept of "techno-cultural style" as one of the most important factors in 
differentiating the progress of Europe and China after the late sixteenth century. 
What China missed, the Europeans had. Moreover, Europeans appreciated a 
number of elements that, in the long term, may have determined their course of 
development. In contrast to the Chinese, Europeans placed (1) value on the use of 
non-human forms of energy and materials; (2) value on accuracy; (3) value on 
'disciplined imagination' (according to Elvin, Chinese pragmatism worked against 
the actual manufacture of a 'flying-carriage'); (4) value on 'geometry in motion'.10 
Elvin considers these crucial differences "in style" as possible explanatory devices 
for China's technological formation, or lack thereof, from the seventeenth century. 
     It is not the purpose of this paper to sort out how Chinese xenophobia, or 
Chinese deficiencies with regard to 'technico-cultural style', may, or may not have 
been, an explanation for the slow dissemination of Western technology in 
nineteenth century China. Moreover, we will not attempt here to become involved 
in the debate between the so-called domestic-limitation school and foreign-
intervention school which have formed the two major approaches to China's 
"failure to modernize." While the latter school clearly places imperialist 
intervention since the first Opium War (1838-42) as the main obstacle to China's
9 
10
This reasoning forms the basis of Peyrefitte's (1989) argument. 
Elvin (1988) 108-112. Elvin's ideas have had a tremendous impact on other historians making 
comparisons between China and the West. See Jones (1990) and Mokyr (1990) 209-238.
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development,11 the former sees China's own institutions and values as the 
inhibiting factors to nineteenth century progress. In this view, foreign 
intervention, however painful or humiliating, is understood either as a benign, or 
a necessary challenge to traditional values and systems, and, not least, a way to 
modernization 12 
     It would be a great mistake to cast all problems concerning technology 
transfer within the parameters of this debate, for as a number of recent 
publications have demonstrated, the process of change is complex, and the 
persons involved had a variety of motives. One thinks of the "transcultural 
milieu" formed from a set of "intellectual and cultural frontiers, outposts of 
intercultural collision where parochial (traditional) commitments were subjected 
to constant challenge".13 It was in this environment where both Westerner and 
Chinese, such persons as John Fryer, Prosper Giguel, Wang Tao, and Yung Wing 
learned about each other.14 'Transcultural men', were neither entirely Western 
nor wholly Chinese; studies of their activities have negated stereotype images 
and, rather, emphasized the individual aspirations of these men, who played such 
important roles in nineteenth century Sino-Western interaction. 
     Taking this view as a starting point, this paper shall examine a number of 
specific incidents of technology transfer from the West to China, and attempt to 
evaluate the persons and places involved. In our investigation specific locational 
conditions are rather important, since the sheer size of China dictated differences 
in how technology was transferred and diffused. We are especially interested in 
the cases of the technology transfer to the silk and tea industries, since both these 
commodities were very much linked to China's involvement in international trade 
already in the eighteenth century.15
11 The groups adhering to this view include not only Marxists and Maoists, but also proponents 
   of Chinese Nationalism, including Sun Yat-sen and Chiang K'ai-shek. For more information 
   about this school, see Cohen (1984). 
12 The classic example of the 'traditional values limitation' school publication is that by Perkins 
   (1967). Dernberger (1975) presents an especially sophisticated analysis of economic 
   modernization in China. It may be argued that Marx's own Euro-centric developmental 
   approach also belongs to the 'traditional values limitation' school (as well as the 'foreign 
   intervention' school). For further discussion and elaboration about this debate, see Cohen 
   (1984). The comparison between China and Japan also forms part of the disputation. 
13 Cohen (1974) 257. 
14 For information about these men, see Bennett (1967), Cohen (1974), Leibo (1985), Schwartz 
  (1964), and Spence (1964). 
15 Lin (1990) has much to say about this.
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1. Some Preliminary 
Transfer'
Remarks on the Concept 'Technology
Before we proceed further with our inquiry, a number of definitions are in order. 
Technology may be defined as knowledge about the ways in which processes and 
products are designed, made or organized.16 In writing about the "transfer of 
technology", one should make a distinction between invention, innovation, and 
dissemination.17 Invention refers to the development of new techniques within a 
region; transmission or diffusion, the transfer of knowledge of technological form 
from one region to another; and dissemination, the widespread adoption of a 
technique. In simplest terms, the transfer of technology is the transfer of 
knowledge, usually embodied in men or machines, and most successful transfers 
involve both.18 
    According to the leading expert in the history of Chinese agricultural 
technology, Francesca Bray, the direct transfer of technology can only take place 
between technological systems at a similar level of development. Transfer 
between technological systems at different levels requires important 
modification.19 To prove her point, Bray recalls the example of Wang Chen's 
Nung-shu (Agricultural Treatise) (1313) which became a classic handbook for local 
magistrates to improve agriculture in regions under their jurisdiction.20 In the 
preface Wang Chen stated that one of the reasons for writing his book was to 
make the agricultural technology of North China known to South China, the 
former being based on dryland cultivation (ti), and the latter on wet fields (t'ien). 
It was Wang's desire that more efficacious tools and techniques might be 
disseminated, so that the relatively labor-saving tools and machines utilized in the 
wheat-growing regions of North China could be adopted in the wheat-growing 
regions of the South. The idea never came to fruition, and according to Bray, this 
was due probably because of such factors as the differences in scale of enterprise 
and patterns of labor-use typical of those technological systems, particular to 
North and South China.21
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21
Jeremy (1991) 1. 
Bray (1991) 211. 
Brown (1979b) 181. 
Bray (1991) 212. 
Bray (1991) 213. 
An interesting example of technology transfer, "between regions at comparative levels of 
development" was that between China and the United States, occurring in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which is related by Tsien (1964-65). In 1868, the charge d'affaires of the American 
Legation in China, Samuel Wells Williams, proposed to the Tsungli Yamen, or Chinese Foreign 
Office an exchange of information about their respective countries. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture was "especially desirous of obtaining information about Chinese agriculture, 
which had supported so large a population for so many centuries." (p. 22). Thus, about one
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     Bray's point, that we must be cautious in our estimation of how technology 
is 'successfully' transferred between systems at a similar level of development is 
underlined by published studies of technology diffusion occurring in Western 
countries during the nineteenth century.22 The slow rate by which application of 
the steam engine spread in England is a case in point. H. H. Habbakuk has 
argued that, although steam power was important in powering the British 
economy in the 1830's and 1840's, it was not massively applied until the 1870's 
and 1880's.23 Nathan Rosenberg, in his study of factors affecting the diffusion of 
technology, notes it is likely that 'old' technology will continue to be improved 
even after the introduction of the 'new', and that it is the fault of historians to 
concentrate their attention on the technological feasibility of the 'new', and end all 
interest in the 'old'.24 Rosenberg demonstrates that the slowness by which the 
stationary steam engine was established as a new source of power in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, was due in part to important improvements which 
continued to be made in design and construction of (old-fashioned) water 
wheels.25 He pleads that the diffusion of technology should be "viewed as 
occurring along a gradual downward slope of real costs rather than as a 
Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction."26 
     In a similar vein, other historians of the Industrial Revolution in the West 
have cautioned that the analysis of the technology diffusion process during the 
1780-1870 era should take into view those artisan skills whose transmission was 
highly dependent upon personal knowledge and contacts 27 There were other
   year later, a certain Colonel Charles D. Poston, appointed Commissioner to China to deal with 
   agricultural matters, arrived in Peking and brought with him, besides a collection of American 
   seeds of grain, vegetables, and pulse, several books relating to agriculture, mechanics, and 
   mining, and maps and reports connected with the survey of the Pacific Railroad, hoping to 
   exchange these for similar materials from the Chinese Government. After some tussling to and 
   fro, the Tsungli Yamen decided "to award" the Americans with books and seeds (but not 
   details of the Chinese population). The books, including the Chinese Classics and scientific 
   works on medicine, agriculture, language, accupunture, mathematics, and metaphysics, 
   running to 934 ts'e or volumes, wrapped in 130 t'ao, formed the U.S. Library of Congress's 
   earliest acquisition in an Asian language. It marked the beginning of Orientalia collections in 
   America, and certainly one of the finest in the entire world. 
22 Bray (1991, 212) acknowledges the importance of Sigaut's (1989) critique of her earlier work on 
   technology transfer. European winnowing-fans constructed in the eighteenth century were not 
   directly inspired by Chinese models. 
      One may appreciate how relatively underdeveloped the study of technology transfer is 
   with Rosenberg's (1972-73) point, that Marc Bloch was probably the first historian to study the 
   effects of the invention of the watermill and its widespread adoption. 
23 Discussed by Rosenberg (1972-73) 5. 
24 Rosenberg (1972-73) 24. 
25 Rosenberg (1972-73) 25. 
26 Rosenberg (1972-73) 33. 
27 Cameron (1975) 220.
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factors important in the technology transfer process that were purely economic, 
i.e. cost-price ratios. Market orientation and accessibility to Britain in terms of 
transport time and cost were most relevant to the rate by which continental 
Europe and North America adopted Great Britain's new technology during that 
era. The transfer of technology from the West to China may be analyzed in a 
similar strategy. Specifically, we argue that much of Western technology could 
only be "transferred" when it met special local conditions.
The Case of Silk Manufacture
     The most penetrating and interesting recent research on the Chinese silk 
industry has concentrated on two regions where raw silk and silk goods have 
been produced in great quantities. Although silk was processed all over Northern 
China in ancient times (and would remain important in Hopei and Shantung), 
after the eighth century sericulture was associated with the southeast regions of 
the country 28 The Lower Yangtze and Lake T'ai region, conventionally known as 
Chiangnan, some 75 to 100 miles from modern Shanghai, and the Pearl River 
Delta near Canton (specifically, the counties of Shun-te, Nan-hai, and Hsiang-
shan) have been considered important sites of the silk industry in the nineteenth 
century 29 The production of silk has always been a labor-intensive industry. The 
stages of silk production all required large amounts of time and labour: the 
silkworms needed constant care and feeding (the keepers had to be alert to the 
danger of various silkworm diseases), the reeling of silk fibers had to be 
completed in great haste, so as to prevent the cocoons from being destroyed by 
emerging moths, and finally, the weaving of silk fabrics involved great skill and 
patience. 
     It was in the second stage of this process, the reeling, that Westerners 
thought machinery could be applicable. Thus, in 1861 the British import-export 
firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company decided to establish a steam-powered 
reeling filature in Shanghai, then the only place in the Chiangnan silk district 
where foreigners were allowed to set up business. In a well-documented study, 
based in part on Jardine-Matheson private records, the American scholar Shannon 
Brown has investigated this filature, known as the Ewo Filature 30 As Brown 
argues, the problem technology transfer for the silk industry there was not 
constructing the filature, nor recruiting and training a local labor force, nor reeling 
the silk, but securing high quality cocoons in the Shanghai hinterland, and
28 For a general introduction to China' silk industry during the Ch'ing, see Shih (1976). 
29 Recent historical studies of the silk industry are Eng (1986), Li (1981), and So (1986). 
30 Brown (1979a).
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transporting them to the treaty-port of Shanghai. Despite a number of initial 
difficulties, the Ewo Filature was founded, and it did produce superior quality 
silk, which sold at higher prices on the British market than European silk. But the 
opposition from the guild of Chinese silk merchants, who forced up the price of 
cocoons throughout the decade of the 1860's, was so great that the operation 
eventually had to shut down. Even if it had been possible to obtain all other 
inputs-labor, coal, capital, etc.-free of charge, the cost of cocoons would still 
have exceeded the value of the finished product. Moreover, the efforts of the 
Filature's manager, John Major, to promote the use of steam power in silk-reeling, 
by demonstrating its advantages were unsuccessful. After Major's death in 1869, 
Jardine-Matheson decided to close the filature, which lost HK$276,000 during the 
dozen years of its existence. Brown concludes that foreigners made little economic 
impact on China in the 1860's. 
     It is worth pointing out here that neither cultural nor political barriers seem 
to have been very important as far as the construction of a plant or the provision 
of a work-force were concerned. Most of the equipment for the factory was made 
in Hong Kong and together, with the skilled labor required to assemble it, brought 
to Shanghai. For the recruitment of a Chinese labor force and their instruction in 
the skill of unwinding cocoons on steam-powered reels, Major had four French 
women reelers sent to Shanghai to teach a core of 25 Chinese women the Western 
techniques of mechanized silk-reeling. This was a great success, and by early 
1863, the filature was operating with Chinese reelers alone. The failure of the Ewo 
enterprise lay in the strength of the Chinese middlemen who were able to prevent 
Major from obtaining what he wanted. Given the large number of cocoon 
producers in the Chiangnan region, it is a tribute to the strength of the silk guild 
that it so frustrated Major's efforts. 
     In the Canton region, it was the local gentry who controlled the production 
and financial sectors of the silk industry. In the mid-1850's, as British and French 
forces attacked and captured Canton, and the Ch'ing government troops were 
busy suppressing the Taiping rebels in Central China, the gentry in this locale 
organized the Kwangtung Province Central Militia Bureau.31 To finance the
31 Wakeman (1966) 165-67; 169-173. In Southeast China, the local power structure, i.e. the 
   relationship between gentry and local government was particularly complex. The local gentry 
   supported numerous institutions to help maintain the community. These included numerous 
   societies and covenants to conduct public affairs or to raise money for and manage specific 
   institutional projects like schools, bridges, dikes, welfare, and, not least, defense. According to 
   Rankin (1990) 33, the detailed township (hsiang) and county gazetteers from Nan-hai give 
   information about the eighteenth and nineteenth century development of locally financed and 
   managed hsiang education institutions. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that long before the 
   mid-nineteenth century crises hit Kwangtung, the local gentry had organized themselves 
   effectively into the community and could penetrate existing social networks without much
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resistance, the gentry had to find their own tax base and looked to the silk 
industry as a ready source for funds. Although sericulture had existed in this 
region in the seventeenth century, it did not really become economically 
important until the expansion of the Canton trade during the eighteenth century.32 
In comparison with the Chiangnan region, the Kwangtung silk industry was a 
relative newcomer, and it would prove to be more receptive to technological 
modernization than the older silk areas 33 
     In the 1860's, as the South China gentry found themselves needing more 
and more funds, they openly stimulated the development of the silk industry by 
encouraging the peasantry to abandon other crops, and switch to the production 
of mulberry leaves, cocoons, and silk-worm eggs. They provided free credit, 
employed silk-worm rearing teachers and advisors, opened mulberry leaf 
markets, and petitioned for tax exemption on raw silk transactions. Moreover, the 
industry soon mechanized itself. The first steam filiature in South China was built 
in 1866 by Ch'en Ch'i-yuan (Chan Kai-wen), a Nan-hai hsien native who had 
traveled widely overseas.34 According to his autobiography, and biographies 
written by his son and grandsons, Ch'en was originally a school teacher; after 
failing to pass in the examination system, he went to Annam where he learned the 
advanced technique of steam reeling. Making a fortune as a trader, he returned to 
China, and with the support of the local gentry set up the first filiature in his own 
native village. It was said that Ch'en paid such a high price for the raw cocoons 
that local peasants no longer found profitable the execution of the reeling process. 
Ch'en himself could afford this economic strategy because of the rising prices of 
silk in the world market, a result of the silk-worm disease in France and Italy, and 
the destruction of mulberry trees in Central China during the last struggles of the 
Taipings. After Ch'en's initial efforts, the steam filiature gradually spread to other 
villages in the region. 
     While the fate of the Kwangtung silk industry by the post-1870 imperialist 
intrusion is beyond the time limitations of this paper, suffice it to say that 
technology transfer in this case developed out of the historical conjuncture of the 
foreign encroachments in the 1840's and 50's, rising silk prices in the world
   difficulty. In fact, it is this background of hsiang local societies in both county cities and smaller 
   towns that lay behind the organization of militia bureaus during the Taiping Rebellion. 
32 Li (1981) 113. 
33 Li (1981) 115, makes the point that Kwangtung was unique among all the silk-producing 
   regions of China in that it was able to support six or seven crops of worms and leaves per year, 
   and many peasant households who raised silk-worms did so on a full-time basis rather than 
   working part-time. 
34 The account hereof Ch'en Ch'i-yuan is based on information in So (1986) 107-109.
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market, the gentry's support of the local economy, and not least, the initiative of 
one resourceful Chinese entrepreneur. The two case studies here support our 
thesis that the transfer of technology must be analysed as a complex interaction of 
internal and external factors, and should not be oversimplified. Both John Major 
and Ch'en Ch'i-yuan had to confront specific local conditions-Major the silk 
guild, and Ch'en the local gentry-to undertake these enterprises. The different 
outcomes of their ventures are also a good indication of how significant regional 
diversities may be in the evaluation of technology transfer from the West.
Further Examples of Technology Transfer
One important source book on industrial technology in China, Chung-kuo chin-tai 
kung-yeh shih tzu-liao ti-i-chi, 1840-1895 nien (Source materials on the history of 
modern industry in China, first collection, 1840-1895) lists some fifteen enterprises 
founded between 1843 and 1860 that brought Western technology to China 35 
These include eight ship repair facilities, four printing establishments, one 
chemical firm, one bakery, and one freight-packing company. Another recent 
documentary collection, Shanghai min-tzu jih-chih kung-yen (The Chinese-Owned 
Machinery Building Industry in Shanghai] provides information on the migration 
of skilled artisans to Shanghai in the nineteenth century. 
     In an unpublished study of this second set of documents, Mark Elvin has 
stressed that these craftsmen, such as scissor-makers from Chechiang, or the 
builders' tools specialists from Soochow, were attracted to the growing economic 
opportunities Shanghai offered in the period 1850-1880.36 The result, Elvin argues, 
was extensive personal contacts between skilled Chinese labour, Chinese 
entrepreneurs, and foreigners, and eventually, the self-sufficiency of the Chinese 
machine-building industry. The fourteen shipyards set up in Shanghai by British 
and American firms in that period were not just industrial enterprises, but also 
"schools for the first generation of China's modern engineers."37 There, ships 
were built by Chinese master-craftsmen and Chinese labourers, many of whom 
were initially imported from Kwangtung Province. Elvin's main argument is that 
the foreign presence in Shanghai facilitated the transfer of modern Western 
machine technology, and that the key factors in this process were "extensive 
personal contacts" and the "continuity of the gamut of opportunities". 
     Elvin's contentions for Shanghai may be relevant for that region and the 
machine building industry there, in particular, but the fact remains that the
35 Sun(1957)1,234-5. 
36 Elvin (unpublished paper) 3. 
37 Ibid.., 4.
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principal motive of those foreigners who founded these shipyards was to do 
business and make profits. The fact that China may have, in the process, acquired 
technological knowledge was secondary to the revenue foreigners expected for 
their investment. Thus, the industries which they pursued were those whose 
products they could sell to the Chinese, or buy from them, to ship to foreign 
markets. Shipping, export-import, and Western-style consumer goods were the 
mainstay of Western investment in China until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Nearly 48% of all foreign capital investment in Chinese industry until 1895 was in 
the processing of exports, and to a minor extent, imports, and nearly all of this 
percentage was either for reeling silk for the European market, or producing brick 
tea for Russian consumers 38 
     Western interest in the mechanization of tea processing began once the 
Canton monopoly system was terminated. After 1842 many Western tea 
importing firms re-located to Foochow to be near tea-growing centres. In Taiwan, 
first opened to Western trade and residence from 1860, foreigners began to 
introduce mechanical means for firming and packing teas. However, because 
foreigners were barred from land ownership there (and elsewhere), as well as 
leasing land outside the treaty ports, a plantation system could not develop, and 
ultimately, they were denied a productive role in the interior tea-growing regions 
areas of China 39 
     The only real impact technology transfer had on the tea industry was in the 
manufacture of brick tea. It was made by the compression of tea dust and low 
quality tea leaves into bricks. A simple steam-powered machine first grounded 
black or green tea leaves into a powder, and then compressed the mixture into 
bricks of a given weight. These bricks were more durable, and less likely to 
crumble than bricks compressed by manpower. Brick tea proved profitable, and it 
was manufactured in great quantities in the two treaty ports of Hankow and 
Foochow. There tea dust and low-quality leaves, otherwise waste-products, were 
easily obtainable from Chinese firms, and coal was cheap 4°
38 Sun (1957) 242-47, provides the following statistical information: 
                       Foreign Industrial Investment by Type, 1895 
           Shipyards and Docks 
           Brick Tea 
           Silk Filatures 
            Other Export-Import Processing Industries 
           Printing, Publishing, and Paper
             Food and Provisions (food, beer, drugs, cigarettes, soap) 
             Construction Materials (wood, bricks, concrete, machinery) 
           Public Utilities 
                            (Adapted from Brown [1979b] 184) 
39 Brown (1979b) 186. Compare Gardella (1976) 141-158. 
40 Brown (1979b) 186.
25.0% 
20.3% 
20.1% 
7.6% 
9.5% 
 7.1% 
2.7% 
 7.7%
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     Brick tea factories were dominated by Russians, although some small 
Chinese firms entered the business 41 The reason for this is simple: brick tea was 
destined for the Russian foreign community. The Chinese had little interest in the 
consumption of brick tea, and therefore gave no opposition to growing Russian 
involvement in the industry in the second half of the nineteenth century. A few 
wealthy Russian firms controlled its manufacture and distribution.42 The opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 stimulated brick tea production, for the home market 
could now be supplied more quickly by sea than by the old overland route 
through Siberia.43 Thus, brick tea, like silk, was an example of a product 
Westerners bought from the Chinese to ship to foreign markets. Whatever 
technology was transferred to these industries in China itself, was limited, and 
conformed to the specific conditions of each geographical location. 
     Another Chinese industry which steam-powered technology may have 
seemed applicable was the soybean industry. Processing soybeans to produce 
cakes and oil had always been a labour-intensive industry. With the exception of 
the grinding of the beans, usually by an an animal-powered stone wheel, all 
aspects of the process were done by humans. Soybeans were a product of northern 
China. It was there that they were crushed to make cake and oil, but the most 
important markets for these items were in south China. Especially important was 
Swatow, where the cakes were used as fertilizer in the production of sugar. 
Foreign participation in the manufacture and trade of this item was prohibited 
until 1863 when the Peking Government, in need of financial support for its 
survival against the Taiping rebels, began to allow foreigners to trade in beancake. 
Their success in dominating the trade in beancake (although not the oil) was swift, 
and led foreigners once again to think about establishing processing factories in 
northern port cities.44 
     Under the initiative of an English merchant, Thomas Platt, Jardine, 
Matheson and Company, offered to finance a steam-powered soybean mill in 
Newchwang in northern China. The plant started production in the spring of 
1869. Here again, Shannon Brown has made an original study of the relevant 
Jardine, Matheson documents, and written:
Boilers and steam engines were used to crush the beans, steam them, and 
prey them. To be sure, the oil-yield rate was lower than in the native mills 
since the greater, but briefer, pressure possible from steam power did not 
extract as much of the slow-flowing oil as did the longer application of
41 
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lower pressure from the traditional technology. Still, it was expected that the 
lower yield would be fully offset by the higher productivity both labor and 
capital-resulting from the new technology. Furthermore, the Western 
technology produced a firmer cake and a better oil than the native 
technology, both of which sold at higher prices than their native 
counterparts. But to realize fully the higher productivity possible with the 
new technology, it was necessary to introduce a totally different system of 
labor discipline and material incentives than that existing in the native mills. 
The effort, which after two years still had not succeeded, was plagued by 
strikes and other forms of resistance, some of it apparently inspired by the 
owners of native mills. The result was that the profitability of the mill was 
reduced to marginal levels... In its third season, despite the improved 
efficiency attributable to 'learning-by-doing,' the plant was closed 45
     The experience here echoes that of John Major in Shanghai, and once again 
reiterates the relevance of specific local conditions. In Swatow, where Jardine's 
compradore (Chinese factotum) established a steam-powered bean-mill in 1880, 
the factory prospered and underwent several expansions over the years. Brown 
attributes the Swatow success story to the low customs taxes there, and the lack of 
previous vested local interests in using the old technology.46
Conclusion: The Transfer of Technology from 
   1780-1870 in Context
the West to China
This paper has discussed, at some length, several experiences of technology 
tranfer between the West and China. Needless to say, the treatment has been 
suggestive rather than exhaustive. The examples discussed here were confined to 
those cited in documentary collections, and secondary studies thereof. Readers 
may have noted that we have entirely neglected the problem of the 'Self-
strengthening Movement' in which the import of Western military technology 
from 1860 for use against both internal and external enemies of the dynasty, 
became a priority. The reason for this is not because Self-strengthening was 
unimportant. Rather, the overwhelming attention this Movement has received 
may have diverted scholarly regard from other relevant matters, and at worse, led 
to misunderstanding. For example, in a study of a poll of seventeen regional 
leaders regarding further expansion of foreign technology importation to China, 
effected in 1867-68, it was demonstrated that only three individuals, Li Hung-
chang, Tseng Kuo-fan, and Shen Pao-chen revealed significant interest in 
telegraphs, railroads, and steamships 47 Thus, it might be concluded that at a
45 
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crucial time in its history, Chinese leadership in the main did not promote 
technical modernization 48 
     However, in the instances we have examined here, the lack of political 
support was not as pertinent to the success or failure of a particular industry to 
utilize Western technology, as the strengths of China's (traditional) political 
economy. While successfully restricting foreigners to operate in treaty ports, the 
Chinese were able to protect their own industries from foreign encroachments. To 
sum up, three factors seem to account for the progress (or lack thereof) of 
technology transfer from the West to China in the era 1780-1870. These are: (1) the 
small profit gained in the application of machine-applied technology; in a country 
where labour was cheap, the use of technology did not necessarily make certain 
manufacturing processes less costly. (2) The influence of Chinese local elites in the 
production process; as demonstrated here in the cases of Kwangtung silk reeling, 
or Swatow bean processing, local elites could and did exert authority over the 
acceptance of foreign technology in their communities. It would seem that the role 
of local elites may have been pivotal in the transformation of late imperial policies 
toward the welfare of local communities. This is a subject that needs much more 
research, based on local archival resources.49 (3) The choice of foreign investments; 
in this period, foreigners invested only in what they could sell at home for a profit. 
Thus, the enterprises in which they involved themselves required less capital than 
did the mining, metallurgical, and military arsenal-type enterprises Chinese 
officials endeavoured to create during the Self-strengthening Movement. None of 
these conditions, it should be clear, has anything to do with the mental ability of 
the Chinese people to adopt Western technology. Let us hope that this paper has 
expelled this myth forever.
48 Smith (1976) makes the important point that one of the goals of the Self-strengthening 
   Movement was to eliminate dependence on foreigners while strengthening China's internal 
   and external defenses. 
49 Although this is not the place to argue whether mid-nineteenth century China was 
   experiencing what historians term "an emerging sphere of public activity between state 
   authority and private society," we may acknowledge the possible relevance of this subject 
   here. For further information about the 'public sphere' in late imperial China, see Rankin 
  (1990) and Rowe (1990).
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